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TAXATION - TAX DELINQUENT LANDS - THE MICHIGAN LAND
BoARD AcT AS A SoLUTION TO THE DELINQUENCY PROBLEM -Nearly
all states have been faced with the increasingly difficult problem of
what to do with the growing volume of tax delinquent land which has
been thrown upon their hands. As a typical example of the financial
aspects of this problem, Michigan in 1928 had over $25,000,000 worth
of delinquent taxes on 8,757,000 acres of property.1 In 1932 this
acreage was estimated at 15,660,000. By 1937 the unpaid taxes in some
of Michigan's counties exceeded five times the assessed vaue of the
delinquent properties.2 Much of the property could not be sold for the
amount of taxes owed, and the increase in the number of delinquencies
~eant a corresponding decrease in the property producing tax returns.
The more unpaid taxes accumulated on any particular parcel, the more
difficult it became to sell that property for back taxes. Finally the legislature in 1937 adopted the State Land Board Act,8 a unique statutory
plan for administering tax delinquent property and hastening its return
to private ownership. In 1939 over 600,000 parcels of land became the
state's in fee simple absolute and the act commenced to function.4
This comment will discuss ( l) the mechanics of the act's operation;
( 2) the constitutional issues involved; (3) the legal problems presented; and ( 4) the probable effectiveness of the act.
I.

The operation of the act can be divided into two distinct chronological phases. The state first acquires an absolute title in the property,
a title free from all liens for state or local taxes. Secondly, the state
attempts to return the property to private ownership, in the hope that
future taxes can thereby be collected from the land.
Simpson, "Tax Delinquence--Economic Aspects," 28 ILL. L. REv. 147 (1933).
See Baker v. State Land Office Board, 294 Mich. 587 at 593, 293 N. W. 763
(1940).
3 Mich. Pub. Acts (1937), No. 155; Stat. Ann. (1940 Supp.),§§ 7.951-7.964.
4 Mustard, "The Land Board Act," 18 M1cH. S. B."j. 396 (1939).
1

2
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The method by which the state acquires its title is not unusual. The
lands are first reported as delinquent for one year or more. 5 If land is
returned as delinquent one year and no taxes are paid in the following
year, the property is subjected to a lien in favor of the state.6 This lien
may then be enforced by the usual tax sale. A sale to a private buyer
must yield at least the total of the taxes, interest and charges on the
property. This sale is not a foreclosure, but a sale of the state's lien.
The price is determined by the taxes and charges owing, and the property goes, not to the highest bidder, but to the person who will pay the
stated price for the smallest portion of the property. 7 No more of the
land will be sold than is necessary to recover this amount. If there are
no acceptable bids on the first offer, the property is reoffered later in
the same sale. If not sold at that time, the property is bid in by the state.
The state's lien may be purchased during the redemption period by any
person paying the accrued taxes and charges. 8 The state formerly allowed a five-year redemption period,° but has now shortened it to one
year or eighteen months, depending on when the sale takes place.10
At the end of this redemption period, title vests absolutely in the state
and this title is free from all liens, assessments and encumbrances. 11
Only after the title vests in the state does the Michigan statute begin to differ from the usual delinquent tax statute. The state's newly
acquired property is divided into two distinct groups. The properties
lying in the upper peninsula and in the northern half of the lower
peninsula form one group and are administered by the department of
conservation as part of its conservation program. 12 The former owners
may force the department .to hold a public sale of these lands by applying for such a sale within thirty days after the title vests in the state.
The sale must return at least twenty-five per cent of the land's last
assessed valuation. Either cash must be paid at the sale or arrangements
must be made for installment payments not to extend beyond ten years.
The owner can outbid others and thus get the title immediately, or he
can meet the highest bid within thirty days after the sale and acquire
title in that manner. If a stranger acquires the property through the
5
Mich. General Property Tax Law, § 55, Comp. Stat. (1929), § 3446, as
amended by Pub. Acts (1937), No. 149, and Pub. Acts (1939), No. 37.
6
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1940 Supp.), §§ 7.104, 7.105.
·
7Id., § 7.u5.
8
Id., § 7.138.
9
Mich. General Property Tax Law, § 127, Comp. Stat. (1929), § 3520, Stat.
Ann. (1936), § 7.181.
10
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1940 Supp.), § 7.120.
11
Id.,§ 7.u2.
12
Id.,§ 7.953. The counties of Oceana, Newaygo, Mecosta, Isabella, Midland and
Arenac form the dividing line and are included in the northern section.
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sale, he receives a deed which reserves the oil, gas, coal and mineral
rights in the property to the state.13
The lands in the southern, industrialized and more highly cultivated areas of the state form the other group and meet an entirely different fate. Lands in these counties are placed under the jurisdiction of
the Land Office Board. The auditor general at this time has his :final
opportunity to ascertain whether any of the taxes for which the land
was sold were paid. If they have, the property is returned to the owner.14
If not, two possible procedures may now be taken. A municipality may
request that the property be withheld for a year 15 or the land may be
offered for sale.16 The municipality may want the property withheld
so it can acquire the same for public purposes by paying the taxes owing.
Or the municipality may ask to have the property withheld at the
request of the owner in order to give him an opportunity to redeem the
property by paying his delinquent taxes.11 The former owner cannot
object to the city's withholding on the ground that it is not for a public
purpose, nor can he complain that the city has :filed its application too
late, as these are matters entirely between the board and the municipality.18 If the taxes are not paid by the municipality or the owner
within this year, the property is offered at the next of the Land Board's
auction sales.19 The purchase price at this auction or "scavenger" sale
must at least equal twenty-five per cent of the assessed value at the time
the title vested in the state.20 It should be emphasized that at this
auction sale the state conveys its property and not merely a tax lien.
The minimum price is set according to a proportion of the assessed
value and not in relationship to taxes formerly due the state and its
subdivisions.
A stranger to the former title must pay cash within twenty-four
13 Id.,§ 7.956. The reservation of mineral rights was held a proper exercise of
legislative power in Krench v. State, 277 Mich. 168,269 N. W. 131 (1936).
14 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1940 Supp.), § 7.953.
15 Id.,§ 7.955.
16 Id.,§ 7.957. For the purposes of the act, a municipality is any county, village,
city, township or school district. See id., § 7.955.
17 The right to withhold and redeem belongs solely to the municipality, but the
redemption can be for a former owner who receives his deed directly from the state.
Oakland County Treasurer v. Auditor General, 292 Mich. 58,290 N. W. 327 (1940).
Under some special city charters, the city can withhold and redeem for other than
public purposes. Slutz v. State Land Office Board, 295 Mich. 185, 294 N. W. 147
(1940).
18 James A. Welch Co. v. State Land Office Board, 295 Mich. 85, 294 N. W.
377 (1940).
19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1940 Supp.), § 7.955. The sale occurs on the second Tuesday of the February following the date when title vests in the state. Id., § 7.957.
20 Id., § 7.957.
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hours of the sale to acquire the land. A party with an interest in the
title 21 has twenty-four hours in which to arrange for installment payments if he does not choose to pay cash.22 He may also have thirty
days after the sale to match the highest bidder with cash or an agreed
installment arrangement which is not to extend more than ten years. Any
taxing unit can also purchase the property. The unit need only pay
cash equal to the sale expenses plus the proportionate part of the taxes
due other units not bidding which were cancelled at the time title
vested in the state. That part of the municipality's taxes which were
cancelled is considered as the balance of the cash payment. The unit
can also meet the highest bidder within :fifteen days after the former
owner's thirty-day period. If various taxing units compete, priority is
given to the one which had the greatest amount of taxes cancelled by
the vesting of the title in the state. In no case can the taxing unit bid
property in except for public purposes and never for resale. The quitclaim deeds which the purchasing units receive have a provision for
reversion of the property to the state if it is not used for public purposes, but this limitation lasts only ten years.
If the property is not sold, it is classified, appraised and rehabilitated by the board for immediate sale at any time for cash equal to
the newly assessed value. 23 This value may be changed by the board as
conditions warrant.2 The special sale may be for cash or on a ten-year
or less instalment plan. The local taxing unit at this time may request
that the property be transferred to it, but the acquisition must again
be only for a public purpose. The new owner, be it a former owner, a
state subdivision, or a stranger, receives a title at the auction or special
sale stemming directly from the state's fee absolute. Unless a municipality acquires title, the property is immediately placed on the local
tax rolls when the bid is accepted, although the certificate and deed
may not be sent until months later.25 The section of the act relating
to the powers of the Land Office Board expires on May I, I 944, at
which time any property remaining within its jurisdiction is to be transferred to the control of the Department of Conservation. 26
4,

21
Id. The act defines a person with an interest as being one who is "owner in
fee, mortgagee, land contract vendee, or one having a substantial interest by way of
actual investment in the property, priority to be given the one having the largest
financial investment in the property." Id., § 7.955.
22
Id., § 7.957. This section contains all the sale provisions discussed.
2s Id., § 7.958.
2
" In practice, the board sells at further auctions. Mustard, "The Land Board Act
and Its Administration," 19 M1cH. S. B. J. 575 at 582 (1940).
25
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1940 Supp.),§ 7.957; Wilson v. City of Pontiac, 294 Mich.

79, 292 N. W. 565 (1940).
.
25
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1940 Supp.), §§ 7.958, 7.964.
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2.

Most of the constitutional arguments directed against the Land
Board Act were resolved in its favor in Baker v. State Land Office
Board.21 The first objection raised was that the former statute had
permitted a five-year redemption period while the present statute
allows but twelve to eighteen months, thereby breaching contractual
rights and depriving persons of property without due process of law
by an unconstitutional retroactive statute. Michigan's Supreme Court
had already ruled: (a) that a decrease in redemption period did not
deprive any one of property without due process; 28 (b) that the interest rate on past delinquent taxes could be raised; 29 ( c) that in any
case the right to redeem was a purely statutory privilege and not a
property right; 80 and ( d) that a state can free lands of delinquent tax
liens. 31 Aided by these precedents, the court had little difficulty in
reaching the conclusion that the shortened redemption period unconstitutionally deprived no one of his property and destroyed no contract
rights.
The Michigan Constitution does require uniformity of taxation, and
some states have held that such a requirement renders unconstitutional
statutes which permit deductions from delinquent taxes. 82 If the former
owner is preferred at the auction sale, and if the sale brings less than
the accrued delinquent taxes, the former owner in effect has certain
taxes deducted from the amount he owed. Minnesota had two statutes,
and the two cases arising thereunder illustrate the difference between
an unconstitutional deduction from past taxes and a valid sale of property to the former owner at a price less than the delinquent taxes. The
first statute permitted the owner to redeem his land by paying a fraction of his taxes and exempted him from the remainder. The court in
State ex rel. Matteson v. Luecke 83 held that such a statute violated
the uniform tax clause of the state constitution. The same court in State
ex rel. Coates v. Butler 34 permitted a former owner to meet a $mo bid
· on property which had been sold to the state for $600 in delinquent
294 Mich. 587, 293 N. W. 763 (1940).
Muirhead v. Sands, I I I Mich. 487, 69 N. W. 826 (1897).
29 Webster v. Auditor General, 121 Mich. 668, 80 N. W. 705 (1899).
3 ° Keely v. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441 (1878); Dumphey v. Hilton, 121 Mich. 315,
80 N. w. I (1899).
81 Hoffman v. Otto, 277 Mich. 437, 269 N. W. 225 (1936).
82 Mich. Const., art. X, § 3. 33 M1cH. L. REV. 1280 (1935) has a good discussion of this phase of the delinquency problem. See also 38 M1cH. L. REV. 427
(1940).
33 194 Minn. 246, 260 N. W. 206 (1935).
34 89 Minn. 220, 94 N. W. 688 (1903).
27
28
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taxes. The statute in the second case was based on the same theory that
the present Michigan Land Board Act uses, namely, the state first
acquires title to the property and then disposes of it at a price which
will permit private owners to purchase it, prior rights being given the
former owners.
Since any classification is constitutional if reasonable and not arbitrary, it would appear that the state legislature had made a valid
distinction between the northern properties, which probably should be
objects of a constructive conservation program, and the southern parcels, which might more easily be returned to the tax rolls. 85
The court was faced by the further plea that the Land Office Act
permitted an unreasonable preference, first in favor of the former
owner, and secondly in favor of the local taxing units. Again the court
found that the law was safely within constitutional limitations. The
policy of the statute is to aid those who could not pay taxes because
of optimistic overassessment and overcapitalization in the pre-depression era. The state, having forced him to lose his property, now offers
the former owner a prior right to recover the land. Surely if the state
will receive as much from the former title holder as from any stranger,
it is not unreasonable in offering him an opportunity to match the
highest bidder. The judgment of the legislature also appears noncapricious in giving taxing units preference over strangers. If the property
is going to be used for public purposes, it seems wise to permit the
municipality to match the highest bidder and thereby acquire title
directly rather than having a stranger first acquire title and then forcing
the municipality to divest it later in expensive eminent domain proceedings. A consideration of the reasons for granting the priority of the
former owner over the municipalities shows a defensible position on
both sides of this issue, and the legislature cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily in choosing one of two reasonable positions. This is especially true when one considers that the state is vitally interested in returning these properties to the tax rolls.
Most of the constitutional arguments can be answered with the
argument that, the title having vested absolutely in the state, the state
can convey the property at any terms it desires to any purchasers it
desires as long as no completely capricious discrimination is made.
Although the legislative selections of priorities may seem unwise to
some, it must be conceded that there is no element of unconstitutional
arbitrariness in the statute.
35
The chart in FoRD, REALTY TAX DELINQUENCY IN M1cH1GAN 20 (1937)
(Univ. Mich. Bureau of Government, Bul. No. 8, N. S.) illustrates the extremely
reasonable result the legislature reached.
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3.
Although many of the constitutional arguments concerning the
Land Board Act were easily settled in the Baker case, a heterogeneous
collection of intricate legal issues remained. These can best be considered through the medium of a question and answer analysis. 36
(I) Can a former owner alienate his right to meet the highest
bidder? To answer this question regard must be given to the four steps
of the act: First the tax sale of the state's tax lien, secondly the vesting
of title eighteen months later in the state, followed by the scavenger
sale and concluded with the owner's matching the highest bidder.
Clearly between the first two steps the former owner still has title to
the land, as the lien is not automatically foreclosed until the redemption period is gone. Until this occurs, he could sell his whole title to
whoever would care to buy it. The title would probably have little
value, as the purchaser would take subject to the rights of a possible
prior mortgagee having a larger financial investment in the property
and therefore priority in the right to meet the highest bidder. But
even a land contract vendee is a party interested in the title 37 under
the act, so undoubtedly a transfer before title vested in the state would
give the vendee a right to meet the bid. If the vendee did not purchase
until title vested in the state, could he contend he had a right to meet
the highest bidder? A purchaser from the former holder in fee who
made his contract after title vested in the state could hardly obtain an
interest in the title, as the former owner had no title to pass. Remembering that the theory underlying the owner's priority is to be lenient
to those whom the state deprived of property through taxes levied
during an unfortunate economic period, the legislature cannot be said
to intend that its preference be an aid to someone now buying in. The
vendee, if he purchased by warranty deed, might claim that he would
receive title by estoppel if the former owner exercised his right, and
therefore he, the vendee, should be able to exercise that right. This
logic appears too technical to be effective against the legislative policy.
Surely after title vests there can be no "investment" in the property,
as it is solely in the state's hands. The right to redeem from the tax
sale is not property; 88 therefore, the right to meet the highest bidder
could not be property. Even if it were, it can hardly be considered the
property to which the statute refers. The arguments applying to a
vendee after title vests and before the scavenger sale would apply
36
Many of the questions discussed in this section are pending in actual cases
mentioned in Mustard, "The Land Board Act and Its Administration," 19 M1cH.
S. B. J. 575 at 584-585 (1940).
37
Supra, note 21.
38
Baker v. State Land Office Board, 294 Mich. 587, 293 N. W. 763 (1940).
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equally well to a contract made after the scavenger sale and within
the thirty-day period. It would be much easier at this time for the
purchaser to contract with the former owner to buy the property, with
the former owner promising to exercise his option and transfer afterwards. Suppose the former owner transfers his right to meet the highest
bid? The purchaser would be met with the statute requiring that he be
an owner in fee, a mortgagee, a land contract vendee or one who has
made an investment in the property. Technically he can meet none of
these tests, nor does the policy of the statute favor him here.
( 2) Can the board rent properties in its possession? The act places
title to the property in the state but puts administration of the land
in the hands of the board and thus apparently gives it the power to
lease. 89 Another section of the statute, however, specifically states that
the board has no power to enter into any lease with any person for
private purposes.40 This would permit the board to collect rentals from
leases existing when title vested, but would prohibit it from giving new
leases or extending old ones. The board has decided that renting will
give the taxing units a little return and that occupancy of the property
is the best insurance against deterioration. Confronted with the necessity
either of obeying the letter of the law or of accomplishing the purposes
of the act, the board has chosen to collect rents and distribute the earnings to taxing units.41 The statute itself apparently gives the board no
such powers except over rentals from leases existing when the board
was given title. While the Supreme Court of Michigan may not be
able to permit the board to continue to function as a landlord, the legislature can and should authorize such procedure.
(3) Can the board improve property it does rent? The act places
on the board the duty to pay over to the taxing units all the moneys
received in proportion to the taxes cancelled.42 The state has made no
appropriations for improvements. Practically, then, the board has no
funds with which to make improvements, although the power to do so
can be implied from the power to rehabilitate.48 As has been suggested,
the legislature might wisely permit the board to rent properties until
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1940 Supp.), § 7.954; Opinion of the Attorney General,
1940, C. C. H. CoRPORATION TAX SERVICE, STATE ANI> LocAL (M1cHIGAN), ,:r 24-045.
40 "No power, either specific or implied, is hereby given to said board to enter
into any lease or leases with any person, copartnership, association or corporation to be
used for any private purposes." Mich. Stat. Ann. (1940 Supp.), § 7.959.
41 The board has collected over $350,000 in rents. Mustard, "The Land Board
Act and Its Administration," 19 MICH. S. B. J. 575 at 586 (1940).
42 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1940 Supp.), § 7.960.
48 Id., § 7.9 58: "All other lands under the jurisdiction and control of the board
shall be classified with the end in view of rehabilitating such lands as rapidly and
speedily as possible and returning said lands to the tax rolls."
811

April

12,

808

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

an advantageous sale could be made. The board, in its discretion, should
be able to disburse the rental proceeds to the taxing units or improve
properties. It might be unreasonable to permit the board to use rentals
from land in one municipality to improve properties in another, but it
would be highly beneficial to permit the board to use rentals, which
would otherwise go directly to certain taxing units, to improve properties so the parcels could be sold and thus give greater benefit to the
same taxing units.
(4) Who would have priority as between an owner and a mortgagee if both attempted to meet the highest bidder at the auction sale?
The statute provides that "priority [is] to be given the one having the
largest financial investment in the property." 44 The highest court of the
state will have to interpret the meaning of "largest financial investment" as it pertains to individual cases which may come before it. If,
as suggested in the following paragraph, the mortgagee can reattach
his lien to the property when a former owner repurchases his land,
the courts will seldom be burdened with litigation concerning the relative priority of the mortgagee and mortgagor, as the mortgagee will
merely wait until the mortgagor has regained title at the scavenger
sale and then reassert his lien.
(5) Suppose the former owner exercised his right to meet the
highest bidder and regained his title, could a former mortgagee then
sue to reestablish his lien? The mortgagee's suit would be based on the
theory of estoppel analogous to the theory whereby a vendee under
a warranty deed obtains title to property which the vendor acquires
after the contract is made. The obstacle to replacing the mortgage is
that under the statute the state has an absolute title free from all former
liens and encumbrances. The Supreme Court itself has ruled that the
title purchased at the auction sale is a new title, one springing directly
from the state, and not coming from the former owner, directly or
indirectly. If this is true, the former owner can claim that the state has
foreclosed a senior lien and thereby removed all junior lienors' rights
as against the land.45 Equitably, it is hard to compare the state's process
of freeing tax delinquent properties from their encumbrances with an
ordinary private sale for the benefit of mortgagees. The state when it
takes title has generously permitted the former owner a chance to regain
his property by paying as much as the highest bidder is willing to pay
at the auction sale. Given such a preference, it seems a harsh rule to
say that the former owner can take advantage of the state's benevolence
to remove private liens as well as tax liens and still retain the property
44

Id., § 7.955.
Robbins v. Barron, 32 Mich. 36 (1875); Krench v. State, 277 Mich. 168,
269 N. W. 131 (1936).
45
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by payment of perhaps an extremely small portion of the total of private and public encumbrances.
( 6) Does the Land Office Board have the power to exchange land
in its possession for other properties? If the board has the south half of
block A and one-half of block B, it might be extremely advantageous
to a city to have the board exchange the portion of block B for the north
half of block A and thereby control all of block A. The city would then
be willing to bid in the whole block for a playground or other public
use, whereas if it had to bid in just half the parcel, it might discover
that the private owners in the north half, knowing that the city could
not have a playground without the whole of the block, would boost the
prices of their vacant lots. The act does not seem to provide for such
an exchange. It directs the steps to be taken in disposition of the land,
and the board is given no discretion in its disposal until after there
have been no acceptable bids at the scavenger sale. At this time, the
board can dispose of the property in any suitable manner and might
easily exchange property to aid the city, which can acquire title at this
stage by merely requesting it. If the land could be exchanged before
the sale, it is difficult to see just where the former owner's right to meet
the highest bidder would lodge. He is not a former owner of the newly
acquired property, and his former property would not be offered at the
auction, as it would be in other hands. This step may be a wise one, but
it can only be permitted by legislative fiat, and such permission does
not seem to have been given.
( 7) Are there any objections to the favorable preferences given
former owners? The constitutional obstacles to such preferences, which
the Baker case properly dismissed, have already been discussed. The
legislative policy in allowing such preferences, however, may be questioned. The permission to match the highest bidder at the auction sale
has caused a loss of competitive bidding at those sales. The former
owner does not want to bid and thus force up the price, and no stranger
cares too much to bid when he knows that a bid can be met by the
former owner.46 Unless there is some combination of strangers or
municipalities bidding at the sale there will be no competition. The
right to meet the highest bidder and pay only a portion of the price in
cash has allowed the former owners to make small down payments and
then pay instalments only if sales of property can be made to meet the
payments.47 Under this system, large real estate dealers can meet many
46 From partial returns, 34 % of the highest bids are met. In the areas where the
largest amount of land is delinquent because of speculation, the former owners bid in a
larger percentage. Wayne county owners met 50.4% of the highest bids. 13 MICH.
MuN. REV. 52 at 55 (1940).
47 The board's policy has been to require down payments of 10%, not less than
$25; balance in monthly installments of $1.12 or more per $100 of balance. 13 MICH.
MuN. REV. 15 (1940).
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bids and, with a small capital, make down payments and wait to see
if they can sell any of the property. If a sale can be made, the property
will be paid for; if no sale is forthcoming, the former owner can simply
let the property return to the state by failure to keep up the instalment
payments on the land contract. If down payments are relatively small,
the former owners can afford to gamble on many lots in the residential
development areas around the larger cities with slight financial risk.4$
The preference of the former owner over the municipality also
tends to hinder the taxing units in their attempt to acquire property for
public purposes. The former owner often needs to pay but a small portion of what the municipality was owed in taxes and force the municipality to pay a much higher price in eminent domain proceedings if t~e
property is really desired for public purposes. The legislature's intention was to place the property on tax rolls so the municipalities might
gain more from new taxes. If the municipalities would rather own the
property for public purposes than look forward to the remote possibility of future taxes being paid on the land, the legislature has effectively blocked the accomplishment of that purpose.

4.
As the results of the scavenger sales of the first year have not yet
been compiled, it is too early to determine how successful the act has
been. From scattered reports several favorable factors can be noted.
The passing of the act has caused many property owners to realize
that the state does intend to enforce the land taxes, and consequently
many taxes have been collected which were not paid previously on the
assumption that no effort would be made to collect them. Larger cities,
like Detroit and Flint, have withheld considerable areas of property,
but nearly forty per cent of the land actually offered at the first auction
sale seems to have been taken.49 Further special sales have placed still
more taxable property in private hands.Go Unfortunately, the preference
given former owners has slowed down permanent return to private
ownership through cash sales. Approximately two-thirds of the property
has gone to former owners who have had to pay but ten per cent of
the sale price in cash.G1 Although no figures are as yet available to sub48 Wayne county illustrates the truth of this, as there early reports show 87.7% of
the sales were on installments to the former owners; 2.6% were cash to owners;
9.7<fo cash to others. 13 M1cH. MuN. REv. 52 at 55 (1940).
49 By Sept. 1, 1940, about 4o<fo of the property offered had been sold. Mustard,
"The Land Board Act and Its Administration," 19 M1cH. S. B. J. 575 at 589 (1940).
The act had raised Wayne county's collection of land taxes from $60,000 in October,
1938, to $831,000 in the same month in 1939.
Go 13 M1cH. MuN. REv. 132 (1940).
61 Id. 52. By Sept. 1, 1940, of the $9,657,640 worth of land sold, only
$3,770,990 was received in cash, the remainder being owed by former owners under
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stantiate the theory, it is quite possible that many of these former
owners are large real estate companies in urban areas who are making
the small down payments on the chance that the property can be sold
at a profit. If no profit is realized, the state may discover that much
of this property will again return to state ownership.
Actual administration of the Land Board Act has revealed certain
defects which need study and possible amendments. It is suggested that
the Land Board be given additional powers to lease to private individuals, to collect rents and to rehabilitate properties with the rentals
collected. Admittedly, this power could be unwisely used by allowing
favoritism in the leasing of properties, but an honest administration of
this power would do much to further the policy of the act by making
the properties more salable to private individuals. The board should
also be given the authority to exchange lands it controls for privately
held properties at the request of municipalities. This would necessitate
the removal of the preferences of the former owners concerned. The
general policy of granting preferences to former owners needs
serious reconsideration. Perhaps it may have been carried so far as to
impair the policy of returning lands permanently to private ownership.
A modification of the preference, such as a restriction of the right to
meet the highest bidder to those former owners who could meet the
bid in cash within twenty-four hours, might result in more genuine
bidding and still not treat the former owner too harshly.

Rex B. Martin
installment contracts. Mustard, "The Land Board Act and Its Administration," 19
MICH. s. B. J. 575 (1940).

